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United States Supreme Court Survey: 
2018 Term 
Iancu v. Brunetti:  Free Speech Meets 
“Immoral and Scandalous” 
Trademarks in the Supreme Court 
Niki Kuckes* 
In 1968, Paul Robert Cohen walked down the hallway of the 
Los Angeles Courthouse wearing a jacket that bore the words “Fuck 
the Draft.”1  He wore the jacket to express his strong opposition to 
the Vietnam War.  For the simple act of wearing a jacket bearing a 
profane message in a place where women and children were 
present, Mr. Cohen was criminally charged and convicted of 
disturbing the peace by engaging in “offensive” behavior.2  The case 
ultimately landed in the Supreme Court of the United States (the 
Court).  The Court agreed that the profanity chosen by Mr. Cohen 
to express his message was “crude,” “distasteful,” “scurrilous,” and 
“unseemly.”3  Mr. Cohen had chosen to use a four-letter word that 
was “more distasteful than most others of its genre.”4  But Mr. 
Cohen’s peaceful display of his “Fuck the Draft” jacket, the Court 
held, was speech protected by the First Amendment’s free speech 
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law.
1. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).
2. Id.
3. See id. at 21–25.
4. Id. at 25.
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guarantee, not simply in its anti-war message but also in the mode 
Cohen chose to express that message.5 
There was no question that Mr. Cohen had the First 
Amendment right to express his political opposition to the Vietnam 
War.  The question, rather, was whether the government could 
regulate his use of profanity as his means of expressing this 
message.6  On this point, the Supreme Court flatly rejected the 
notion that the States, “acting as guardians of public morality,” may 
properly remove offensive words from the public vocabulary in 
order to maintain “what they regard as a suitable level of discourse 
within the body politic”7 or to protect the sensibilities of members 
of the public.8  In what may be the most famous quote from Cohen, 
the Court observed, “it is . . . often true that one man’s vulgarity is 
another’s lyric.”9  It is because government officials cannot make 
“principled distinctions” in this area that the First Amendment 
leaves such matters of expression to individuals.10  Cohen’s 
conviction was invalidated. 
The government’s power to burden speech because the speaker 
has chosen to use words that offend public sensibilities is once again 
the subject of a recent Court First Amendment decision.11  
Ironically, it was the very same four-letter word of profanity used 
in Cohen that led to the Court’s First Amendment decision in Iancu 
v. Brunetti, issued at the end of the Court’s October 2018 Term.12
Almost fifty years after the Court issued its Cohen decision
protecting Mr. Cohen’s “Fuck the Draft” jacket, the Court was
called upon to rule on whether the government could bar a
trademark owner from federally registering “FUCT” as the brand
for his clothing line.13  While the context is different—and much
First Amendment law has developed in the interim—the
arguments in the two cases bear a strikingly similarity.
5. Id. at 26.
6. Id. at 19.
7. Id. at 22–23.
8. Id. at 21.
9. Id. at 25.
10. Id.
11. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019).
12. Id. at 2297.
13. Id. at 2297.
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In Iancu v. Brunetti, as noted, the First Amendment 
controversy arose from Mr. Brunetti’s efforts to federally register 
the trademark “FUCT” for his clothing line.14  Using its statutory 
power to reject marks that it deems “immoral [or] scandalous,” the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) refused to 
register the mark.15  To defend the PTO’s actions, the government 
insisted, in echoes of Cohen, that government officials may properly 
be given broad power to deny a legal status to trademarks it deems 
“disgraceful,” “offensive,” “disreputable,” or “vulgar” without 
running afoul of the First Amendment.16 
The case might seem to present a straightforward application 
of the Cohen principles.  In 1971, the Supreme Court readily saw 
the “shortcomings” of a position that would allow government 
officials to punish peaceful speech expressed in expletives or other 
offensive words in order to “maintain what they regard as a suitable 
level of discourse within the body politic.”17  But in the intervening 
years since the Cohen decision, the Court has spilled a great deal of 
ink issuing First Amendment free speech decisions.  The dizzying 
array of First Amendment principles and caveats adopted in the 
interim made Iancu more difficult than the logical, intuitive, and 
eloquent application of the comparable principle in the Cohen case. 
Indeed, its Iancu decision was not the first time the Court 
struggled with virtually the same First Amendment issue.  Two 
terms earlier, the Court took up a First Amendment challenge to a 
closely related statutory bar under the Lanham Act—a bar on the 
registration of trademarks that “disparage” persons or groups—in 
Matal v. Tam.18  In that case, the Court struck that provision down 
unanimously without reaching an opinion representing a majority 
14. Id.  The Court had little difficulty in perceiving Mr. Brunetti’s
alternative spelling of “FUCT” as the “equivalent of [the] past participle form 
of a well-known word of profanity.”  Id. 
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012) (providing that the PTO may refuse
registration to trademarks that include or consist of “immoral, deceptive, or 
scandalous matter”).  There is no dispute with respect to the constitutionality 
of the PTO’s power to refuse registration to “deceptive” trademarks.  Iancu 
concerned the rest of this clause (the statutory bar on registering “immoral . . . 
or scandalous” marks).  Rather than treating the two adjectives separately, the 
PTO has long applied this as a “unitary provision.”  See Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 
2298.   
16. See id.
17. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23 (1971).
18. See 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1747 (2017).
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of the Court.19  I previously wrote on the Court’s inability in Matal 
v. Tam to agree on any single First Amendment lens through which
to analyze the statutory bar in that case and the missed opportunity
to make a clear and powerful statement of First Amendment law.20
Given a second chance to revisit the same statutory provision, 
the Court has now rallied in Iancu to garner both a convincing 
majority and a single rationale to support its conclusion that a 
statutory bar on registering “immoral or scandalous” trademarks 
cannot withstand First Amendment scrutiny.  Ultimately, the 
modern Supreme Court reached the same conclusion that the Court 
had so easily come to in 1971, that a “law disfavoring ‘ideas that 
offend’” violates the First Amendment.21  This result is hardly 
surprising; it should be self-evident that government officials 
cannot, as a constitutional matter, be given power to decide that 
private speech is “immoral or scandalous” and should be banned, 
burdened or punished on that ground. 
While the Iancu Court clearly reached the correct conclusion, 
the reasoning of its decision is far more labored than the eloquent 
Cohen opinion.  One might be tempted to credit the historical 
context—after all, Cohen’s thoughtful affirmation of constitutional 
free speech values concerned a protest to the Vietnam War and was 
decided during the height of anti-war protests in 1971.  But Justice 
Alito takes pains to point out in his concurrence that we too are in 
a historical moment when “free speech is under attack.”22  In many 
countries with constitutions or legal traditions that “claim to 
protect freedom of speech,” he states, “serious viewpoint 
discrimination is now tolerated.”23  In no uncertain terms, he 
includes the United States in his indictment, “such discrimination 
has become increasingly prevalent in this country.”24  If indeed 
reaffirming that the First Amendment “does not tolerate viewpoint 
discrimination” is no less important today than in 1971,25 a 
19. See id. at 1765.
20. See generally Niki Kuckes, Matal v. Tam: Free Speech Meets
“Disparaging” Trademarks in the Supreme Court, 23 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. 
REV. 122 (2018). 
21. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2301–02.
22. Id. at 2302–03 (Alito, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 2302.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 2303.
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historical explanation for the modern Court’s difficulty in writing a 
clear affirmation of this free speech principle does not ring true.  A 
convincing explanation must be found elsewhere. 
Iancu vividly illustrates the rigidity, complexity, and 
unworkability of modern First Amendment law as it has developed 
since 1971.  First Amendment law has been compartmentalized 
into a series of conceptual boxes, differentiated by the “level of 
scrutiny” to be applied (strict, intermediate, rational basis, and so 
on).  First Amendment analysis now proceeds on the flawed 
assumption that all free speech cases can fit into one of these boxes; 
in any given free speech case, a great deal of time is spent arguing 
over which box is correct.  In the Tam-Iancu set of cases, the limits 
of that approach become apparent. 
Below, this Survey begins in Section I by providing context for 
the Court’s Iancu v. Brunetti decision by explaining the significance 
of the statutory bar for “immoral or scandalous” trademarks and 
the relationship between the Iancu dispute and the Court’s earlier 
Matal v. Tam decision.  In Section II, the Survey explores some key 
difficulties with modern First Amendment law illustrated by the 
Tam-Iancu sequence of decisions, and the narrow and 
compartmentalized constitutional analysis that modern free speech 
doctrine contemplates.  Finally, in Section III, the Survey considers 
the weaknesses and strengths of the Court’s Iancu decision, and 
asks whether, ultimately, the decision should be considered a 
disappointment or a triumph. 
I. IANCU V. BRUNETTI:  THE CASE AND ITS CONTEXT
  The Iancu v. Brunetti case arose from the efforts of Erik 
Brunetti, an artist and entrepreneur who founded a clothing line, 
to federally register the trademark name he used for his clothing 
line:  “FUCT.”26  Mr. Brunetti not only used a variation of the same 
profanity as had Mr. Cohen in the 1971 decision, but he also 
prominently displayed it on clothing to be worn publicly.  Beginning 
in 2011, Mr. Brunetti pursued an application to place “FUCT” on 
the government’s federal trademark registry as his brand for 
certain items of clothing.27  Mr. Brunetti soon ran into difficulty 
(albeit not with a criminal prosecution), as described further below. 
26. Id. at 2297.
27. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
2020] SUPREME COURT SURVEY 85 
A. The Role of Federal Trademark Registration
When Mr. Brunetti applied to register the trademark “FUCT”
for his clothing line, he was taking the only prudent course for a 
trademark owner. The federal government’s trademark 
registration scheme, in place in its current form since 1946, allows 
individuals, businesses, and groups to secure nationwide legal 
protection for their trademarks by registering them with the 
PTO.28  The Court dryly describes federal trademark registration 
as offering “valuable benefits.”29  Both the majority and dissenters 
emphasize that a seller can use a brand name as a trademark 
without federally registering it, and that unregistered marks still 
enjoy some legal protection outside of the federal scheme.30  While 
this is technically true, no business with aspirations to distribute 
its products nationwide could possibly afford to rely on state law 
protection alone for its trademark.  Such a business would be at a 
severe disadvantage against competitors with federally registered 
trademarks and at the mercy of opportunists who could seek to 
piggy-back on the success of an emerging brand. 
The Supreme Court’s technical descriptions of the 
consequences of federal trademark registration might suggest to 
the reader that registration under the Lanham Act provides a series 
of procedural benefits that are desired by trademark holders, but 
that federal registration is not necessary.  The Court begins its 
opinion by noting that registration is not “mandatory” and that the 
holder of an “unregistered trademark may still use it in commerce 
and enforce it against infringers.”31  The Court goes on to list 
certain (mainly procedural) “benefits” that flow from trademark 
registration (registration is treated as “prima facie” evidence in 
litigation that the trademark is valid, registered trademarks can 
28. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(a) (2012).
29. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2297; see also Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1753
(2017) (noting that federal registration “confers important legal rights and 
benefits on trademark owners who register their marks”) (citation omitted).  
Justice Sotomayor, in partial dissent, downgrades the consequences of federal 
registration to merely providing “several ancillary benefits” to trademark-
holders.  See Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2316 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  
30. See Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2297; see also id. at 2308, 2316, 2317
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
31. Id. at 2297 (majority opinion).
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gain further defenses by the opportunity to achieve “incontestable” 
status, registered trademarks can get government assistance in 
halting the import of infringing goods, and so on).32 
What can get lost in that list of “benefits,” to a reader 
unfamiliar with trademark law, is that the most valuable aspect of 
federal registration is not procedural but substantive:  It is only by 
achieving federal registration for a mark that the trademark owner 
gains nationwide legal protection for that mark.  The very genesis 
of the federal trademark registration scheme was the congressional 
recognition that leaving trademark protection to State common law 
had become an impediment to creating a truly national economy.33  
Trademark rights, left to State law, had become “uncertain and 
subject to variation in different parts of the country.”34  Given the 
important role played by trademarks in promoting fair competition 
and maintaining product quality, Congress determined that “a 
sound public policy requires that trademarks should receive 
nationally the greatest protection that can be given them.”35 
Using its powers under the Commerce Clause, Congress 
enacted the Lanham Act in 1946 specifically to “provide national 
protection for trademarks used in interstate and foreign 
commerce.”36  Without federal registration, a trademark owner 
cannot get nationally effective legal protection for a mark.  Instead, 
he is entitled to exclusive use of the trademark only in the limited 
local areas where he has actually used the mark, and is relegated 
largely to the patchwork of State law trademark protections decried 
by Congress in 1946 as inadequate.37  As important, without the 
nationwide protection conferred by Lanham Act registration, once 
a particular brand begins to enjoy commercial success, a 
“competitor can swoop in and adopt the same mark for the same 
goods in a different location.”38  In short, federal registration is 
essential for any serious business with aspirations to market goods 
nationally (in other words, for any business). 
32. Id. at 2297–98.
33. Park ‘N Fly v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985).
34. Id.
35. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 6 (1946)).
36. See id.
37. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
38. Id.
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Describing federal registration as beneficial but not necessary 
because the trademark owner can still sell goods under the 
trademark is like describing car registration as beneficial but not 
necessary: Unregistered cars can still be driven on private property, 
and are simply barred from using public roads, but this scarcely 
makes car registration optional in any meaningful sense.  As the 
Federal Circuit has emphasized, the legal consequences that flow 
from federal trademark registration are “now so significant as to 
make federal registration indispensable for any owner making an 
informed decision about its trademark rights.”39  The Lanham Act 
is more properly understood—like car registration—as a regulatory 
scheme with important public purposes that operates through a 
registration process rather than a “benefit” scheme for trademark 
owners (a point that becomes important for First Amendment 
purposes, as discussed later).40 
B. The Bar on Registering “Immoral or Scandalous Marks”
Under the Lanham Act, trademarks that are “used in
commerce” and are capable of identifying the source of a product 
are presumptively entitled to federal registration.41  These 
requirements relate directly to the Act’s dual purposes of protecting 
consumers’ interest in purchasing known goods and protecting the 
investment of trademark holders in the quality of their brand.42  
The statute also specifies certain circumstances in which 
trademarks will not be registered.43  Many of these statutory bars 
similarly relate directly to the Act’s goals; trademarks will not be 
registered, for example, if the proffered mark is so similar to a mark 
already registered that it would “cause confusion,” cause “mistake,” 
or “deceive.”44 
However, the Lanham Act also has a “hodgepodge of 
restrictions” that bar registration for other reasons.45  It was one of 
those restrictions that proved problematic in Mr. Brunetti’s case: 
39. Id. at 1341.
40. See, e.g., id. at 1346 (“Trademark registration is a regulatory
activity.”). 
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (2012).
42. See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1328.
43. See § 1052.
44. § 1052(d).
45. Tam, 808 F.3d at 1329.
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The statutory bar that directs the PTO to refuse registration to 
“immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks.46  That wording has an 
antiquated air, and it may come as no surprise that the provision 
originated as part of trademark legislation adopted by Congress in 
1905.47  As it appears in the Lanham Act, the bar says that 
registration may be refused to a trademark that “[c]onsists of or 
comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter.”48  Despite the 
statute weaving those restrictions together, the PTO has long 
treated “deceptive” marks as a separate type of bar, and treated 
“immoral or scandalous” marks as a single category (often simply 
termed the “scandalousness” bar).49 
To determine whether a trademark application should be 
rejected on the “scandalousness” basis, the PTO must determine 
whether a “‘substantial composite of the general public’ would find 
the mark scandalous, defined as ‘shocking to the sense of truth, 
decency or propriety; disgraceful; offensive; disreputable; . . . giving 
offense to the conscience or moral feelings . . .  or calling out for 
condemnation.’”50 Alternatively, the PTO may prove 
scandalousness by establishing that a mark is “vulgar.”51  Vulgar 
marks are also described as “lacking in taste, indelicate, [and] 
morally crude.”52 
“Disreputable”?  “Lacking in taste”?  Shocking to “the sense of 
truth”?  If anything, the subjective terms supplied by case law are 
even broader than the statutory language.  The cases can hardly be 
said to limit the breadth of the statutory terms or provide helpful 
guidance.  This may well be an impossible task.  The PTO’s 
administrative trial tribunal has itself noted that the guidelines are 
“somewhat vague” and the decision whether to reject a mark on 
“scandalous” grounds is “necessarily a highly subjective one.”53  The 
46. § 1052(a).
47. See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1330 (citing Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, §5(a),
33 Stat. 724, 725). 
48. § 1052(a).
49. See In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that
the PTO treats the bar as a “unitary provision” that it refers to as the “immoral 
or scandalous provision”).   
50. Id. at 1336 (quoting In re Fox, 702 F.3d 633, 635 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
51. Id. (citing Fox, 702 F.3d at 635).
52. Id. (quoting In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 486 (C.C.P.A. 1981)). 
53. In re In Over Our Heads, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1653, 1990 WL 354546 at
*1 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 28, 1990); see also Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1354.
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Federal Circuit, looking to the history of trademark applications 
considered under the statutory bar, made the frank observation 
that it could not “discern any pattern indicating when the 
incorporation of an offensive term into a mark will serve as a bar to 
registration and when it will not.”54 
C. The Inevitable Fate of Mr. Brunetti’s Trademark “FUCT” in
the PTO
Given this panoply of subjective terms, Mr. Brunetti’s case did 
not prove difficult.  The examining attorney found the trademark 
“FUCT” to be the “past tense of the verb ‘fuck,’” and denied the 
trademark registration as a “vulgar” word.55  That decision was 
affirmed on appeal with the PTO by its administrative tribunal, 
which found “FUCT” to be both “highly offensive” and “vulgar,” with 
“decidedly negative sexual connotations.”56 
Mr. Brunetti thus joined a long line of trademark owners whose 
applications for registration had similarly been rejected over the 
years as “immoral or scandalous.”57  In the 1930s, the PTO found 
“scandalous” and refused registration to such marks as 
“MADONNA” for wine and “QUEEN MARY” for women’s 
underwear.58  Eighty years later, by contrast, the “BLUE NUN” 
was considered acceptable for wine.59  Instead, the PTO’s “immoral 
or scandalous” rejections included marks such as “BULLSHIT” for 
beverages, “1-800-JACK-OFF” for adult-oriented telephone 
conversation services, and “THE BEARDED CLAM” for restaurant 
services.60 
Given the breadth of the statutory language, such rejections 
were by no means limited to profane or sexually suggestive marks. 
54. Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1354.
55. Id. at 1337.
56. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2298 (2019).  The Board also
relied on the “anti-social” and “nihilistic” content of Mr. Brunetti’s website as 
support for its rejection.  Id.   
57. In an excellent and very thorough article, authors Anne Gilson
LaLonde and Jerome Gilson documented the PTO’s history of granting and 
denying marks challenged as “immoral or scandalous.”  See Anne Gilson 
LaLonde & Jerome Gilson, Trademarks Laid Bare: Marks That May Be 
Scandalous or Immoral, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1476, 1488–1533 (2011). 
58. Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1336 (citations omitted).
59. See BLUE NUN, Registration No. 3754794.
60. LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 57, at 1541–42.
90  ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:80 
An in-depth study of the history of the statutory bar found a “wide 
variety of trademarks . . . implicated by the ban on registering 
scandalous and immoral marks, from religion and political imagery 
to sexual matter, profanity and illegality.”61  Thus, the PTO 
rejected as “immoral or scandalous” trademarks with political 
messages that it read to suggest support for the terrorist group al-
Qaeda (“BABY AL QAEDA” and “AL QAEDA” for t-shirts).62  The 
PTO also deemed “immoral or scandalous” trademarks it deemed to 
convey approval for or “glamorize” drug use (“YOU CAN’T SPELL 
HEALTHCARE WITHOUT THC” for pain-relief medication).63 
Even to the untutored eye, a statutory standard that invites 
government officials to decide whether particular words or terms 
are “immoral or scandalous” and should thus be denied a legal 
status poses evident free speech concerns.  But the Federal 
Circuit—which hears all appeals from registration denials by the 
PTO—had until recently taken the position that the First 
Amendment was not implicated by the Lanham Act’s statutory 
bars.64  As recently as 2011, trademark law experts predicted that, 
while legally problematic, the statutory bar to registering “immoral 
or scandalous” trademarks was unlikely to lose a First Amendment 
challenge any time soon.65  By the time Mr. Brunetti’s First 
Amendment challenge reached the courts, however, the timing 
proved opportune. 
D. The Back Story:  The Slants Test the First Amendment Waters
The groundwork for Iancu v. Brunetti, as noted, had already
been laid two terms earlier in the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment decision in Matal v. Tam.66  Tam involved a free 
speech challenge to another statutory bar to federal trademark 
registration—the bar on registering “disparaging” trademarks 
61. Id. at 1510.
62. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2300–01 (2019).
63. Id. at 2300.
64. See In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
65. LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 57, at 1531 (“All challenges to the
validity of Section 2(a)’s ban on scandalous marks on the basis that it violates 
the First Amendment have met a brick wall that is unlikely to crumble any 
time soon.”).   
66. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
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(those that disparage persons or groups).67  Simon Tam named his 
band, made up entirely of Asian-Americans, “The Slants” as a way 
of reclaiming an ethnic slur.68  He then applied to register “THE 
SLANTS” as the trademark for his band’s musical services.69  After 
determining that this term was considered disparaging by many of 
Asian descent, the PTO refused to register “The Slants” as a 
trademark for the band.70  Mr. Tam challenged the statutory bar 
on First Amendment grounds.71 
The Tam case may have involved an obscure band name, but 
notably, the very same issue was also confronting a far better-
known and highly valuable trademark—the team name for the 
Washington Redskins.  The “REDSKINS” trademark had just been 
cancelled by the PTO after many years of federal registration, on 
the ground that the term was “disparaging to Native Americans.”72  
That case was making its way through the courts in the Fourth 
Circuit at the very same time as Mr. Tam’s free speech challenge 
was being decided by the Federal Circuit.73  It was, in a sense, a 
perfect storm for First Amendment concerns over trademark 
registration. 
The Federal Circuit used this opportunity to reconsider and 
reverse its longstanding position that the bar on registering 
“disparaging” trademarks presented no First Amendment issues. 
Sitting en banc, the Federal Circuit struck down the statutory bar 
as an unconstitutional burden on private speech in a decision that 
generated no less than five opinions arguing over the correct 
constitutional approach.74  The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
67. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012) (prohibiting the registration of
trademarks that “disparage . . . or bring . . . into contempt, or disrepute” any 
“persons, living or dead”).   
68. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1754.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080
(T.T.A.B. 2014) (cancelling the “REDSKINS” trademark for being 
“disparaging” to Native Americans).  
73. See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439 (E.D. Va.
2015) (affirming PTO’s cancellation of “REDSKINS” trademark), vacated, 709 
F. App’x 182 (per curiam) (4th Cir. 2018).
74. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Tam, 137 S.
Ct. at 1754–55 (summarizing the “assortment of theories” expressed in the 
opinions generated in the en banc Federal Circuit decision). 
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as is its practice when a federal circuit court invalidates a federal 
statute on constitutional grounds.75 
The most remarkable thing about the Supreme Court’s ensuing 
decision in Tam was that even though all participating Justices 
agreed that the bar on registering “disparaging” trademarks was 
unconstitutional—and even though all agreed further that the 
constitutional flaw was that the Lanham Act provision unlawfully 
authorized “viewpoint discrimination” against private speech by 
government officials—the eight Justices participating could not 
reach agreement on any single articulation of a rationale for the 
Court’s decision.76  In writing for the majority in the later Iancu 
decision, Justice Kagan highlights that oddity, noting that the 
Court “could not agree on the overall framework for deciding the 
case” even though there was “common ground” for a “core postulate 
of free speech law: The government may not discriminate against 
speech based on the ideas or opinions it conveys.”77  As noted, I have 
also written at length on the puzzling breakdown in the Matal v. 
Tam decision.78  It was against this background that Iancu came 
up for review before the Supreme Court. 
E. The Iancu v. Brunetti Court Finds a Majority Where the Matal v.
Tam Court Failed
Given a second chance in Mr. Brunetti’s case, with artful
drafting by Justice Kagan, the Supreme Court was able to not only 
agree that the statutory bar on registering “immoral or scandalous” 
trademarks fails under the First Amendment but also reach 
common ground on why it does so.  To garner the support of six 
75. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2298 (2019) (“As usual when a
lower court has invalidated a federal statute, we granted certiorari”).  In Matal 
v. Tam, the lawyers for Pro-Football took the unusual step of asking the
Supreme Court to bypass the federal appellate process and take certiorari in
the REDSKINS case before the Fourth Circuit had ruled, along with the
Supreme Court’s consideration of THE SLANTS trademark application.  The
Supreme Court denied that request.  See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 137
S. Ct. 44 (2016).  However, Pro-Football did participate as amicus curiae in
Matal v. Tam.  See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1758 (citing to Pro-Football amicus brief).
76. See generally, Kuckes, supra note 20, at 134–56 (noting the areas of
agreement and disagreement among the three plurality decisions in Matal v. 
Tam). 
77. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2298–99.
78. See generally, Kuckes, supra note 20.
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Justices, Justice Kagan wrote a narrow opinion concluding that the 
statutory bar suffers from exactly the same free speech flaw as the 
bar on registering “disparaging” trademarks: “[i]t is viewpoint-
based.”79  To reach that conclusion, Justice Kagan does a masterful 
job of emphasizing those aspects of the case that make the issue 
seem, indeed, indistinguishable from Tam.  The statutory provision 
at issue in Iancu empowered government officials to reject a legal 
status to trademarks which are found “immoral or scandalous.”80  
When is expressive material “immoral,” Justice Kagan asks?  When 
it is “inconsistent with rectitude, purity, or good morals” or 
“opposed to or violating morality.”81  That Lanham Act provision, 
she concludes, thus permits registration of marks that “champion 
society’s sense of rectitude and morality, but not marks that 
denigrate those concepts,” which can only be described as viewpoint 
discrimination.82 
The statutory term “scandalous,” Justice Kagan goes on, is 
likewise defined as material that “giv[es] offense to the conscience 
or moral feelings” and “call[s] out condemnation.”83  That means, 
once again, that the Lanham Act provision allows registration of 
marks “when their messages accord with, but not when their 
messages defy, society’s sense of decency or propriety.”84  That is 
viewpoint discrimination once again.  “Put the pair of overlapping 
terms together,” and what you find, she concludes, is that the 
statute on its face distinguishes between two opposing ideas: “those 
aligned with conventional moral standards and those hostile to 
them.”85  Trademarks that induce “societal nods of approval” are 
favored, but those that provoke “offense and condemnation” are 
disfavored.86  The statute burdens messages that express offending 
viewpoints and favors those with positive or innocuous points of 
view (thus, she predicts, “HATE RULES” will not be registered as 
a trademark, but “LOVE RULES” will).87  Justice Kagan finds the 
79. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2299.
80. Id. at 2298.
81. Id. at 2299 (citing dictionary definitions).
82. Id. at 2299–300.
83. Id. (alterations in original) (citing dictionary definitions).
84. Id. at 2300.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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same flaw in the PTO’s record of applying the statute.  Looking to 
the record of granting and rejecting trademark applications under 
the statutory bar, she concluded that the facial viewpoint bias in 
the statute has also led to viewpoint-discriminatory application.88  
To support that conclusion, she selects an interesting set of 
examples from the (voluminous) administrative record.89 
Recall that the statutory bar on registering “disparaging” 
trademarks, struck down in Tam, had on its face allowed marks 
that commented positively on a group but barred marks that 
commented negatively on (that is, “disparaged”) the same group. 
Thus, the PTO allowed the registration of trademarks that made 
positive comments about an ethnic or religious group but refused 
registration to marks that were hostile to the same group.  The 
trademark “ASIAN EFFICIENCY” was registered but “THE 
SLANTS” was not.  The trademark “THINK ISLAM” was approved 
for registration but “STOP THE ISLAMISATION OF AMERICA” 
was rejected.90  In Tam, those results followed naturally from the 
statutory language.  Because “disparaging” is by definition the 
opposite of “praising,” the statutory bar in Tam was inevitably 
applied in a way that discriminated between marks that expressed 
positive and negative views on the same topic.91  In a pithy 
example, Justice Kennedy observed in his plurality opinion in Tam 
that if the government’s defense of the PTO’s ability to reject 
“disparaging” trademarks were constitutional, “a law would be 
viewpoint neutral even if it provided that public officials could be 
praised but not condemned.”92  Using an example of a law that 
would obviously be constitutionally indefensible, he showed starkly 
the problematic nature of the “disparaging” trademarks bar. 
In crafting the majority opinion in Iancu, Justice Kagan picked 
examples to illustrate that the bar on “immoral and scandalous” 
trademarks worked in just the same manner as Justice Kennedy’s 
example above.  She emphasized that the PTO, applying its 
88. Id.
89. See id.; see also LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 57 (detailing an
extensive history of the PTO’s application of the “immoral or scandalous” 
statutory bar).   
90. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
91. See id.
92. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1766 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment). 
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“scandalousness” inquiry, had allowed the registration of marks 
that conveyed an anti-drug message (such as “SAY NOT TO 
DRUGS – REALITY IS THE BEST TRIP IN LIFE”) but refused 
registration to marks that glamorized drug use (such as “YOU 
CAN’T SPELL HEALTHCARE WITHOUT THC”).93  Trademarks 
that supported religious faith were registered (such as “PRAISE 
THE LORD”) but those with an anti-religious or blasphemous 
message were rejected (such as “BONG HITS 4 JESUS”).94  
Differential treatment by the government of private speech on the 
same topic, depending on whether it is critical or laudatory, does of 
course constitute obvious and unconstitutional “viewpoint 
discrimination.”  As Justice Kennedy observed in Tam, the key flaw 
in the bar on “disparaging” marks is that within a single category, 
“an applicant may register a positive or benign mark but not a 
derogatory one,” a consequence that is “the essence of viewpoint 
discrimination.”95  Justice Kagan’s close adherence to the common 
ground among the Tam pluralities charted a wise course and clearly 
succeeded in garnering a strong majority for a clear statement of 
First Amendment law (a result that an eight-member Court could 
not achieve two years earlier). 
At the same time, the Iancu v. Brunetti majority opinion 
glosses over some broader issues.  The truth is that many of the 
trademarks rejected by the PTO under the “scandalousness” bar 
express no viewpoint at all.  Can a trademark like “FUCT” really 
be said to express a “view” on any particular issue?  The mark was 
rejected not because it expressed a viewpoint, but because it was 
found “vulgar.”  Mr. Brunetti was trying to create shock value for 
his brand not by expressing a viewpoint criticizing anything in 
particular but by using shocking language.  Even still, the 
government regulating private speech because it has found it 
“offensive” or “distasteful” should be as abhorrent to First 
Amendment values as classic viewpoint discrimination.  That 
insight, expressed so well and so naturally in the Cohen decision in 
1971, was lost in the cautious structure of the Iancu majority, as 
discussed further below. 
93. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2300.
94. Id.
95. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). 
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II. WHAT THE IANCU-TAM CASES REVEAL ABOUT MODERN FIRST
AMENDMENT DOCTRINE 
Together, the splintered decisions in Tam and the more 
successful resolution of virtually the same issue in Iancu shed a 
spotlight on the problematic nature of current First Amendment 
free speech doctrine.  That problem can be highlighted by a simple 
question:  How could it be that in Tam, eight members of the Court 
unanimously agreed that the Lanham Act provision at issue 
violated the First Amendment, but could not agree why?  Justice 
Kagan explained the answer well:  In Tam, the Court could not 
agree on an overall framework for deciding the case because “no 
majority emerged to resolve whether a Lanham Act bar is a 
condition on a government benefit or a simple restriction on 
speech.”96  This brief note about whether trademark registration is 
a “government benefit” hints at a much larger First Amendment 
debate.  Justice Kagan succeeded in Iancu by crafting a narrow 
decision that largely managed to sidestep that debate. 
The challenge faced by Justice Kagan in Iancu was to write an 
opinion that avoided the need to characterize the nature of 
trademark registration.  Otherwise, the decision would have 
become mired in a set of very difficult questions:  Should trademark 
registration be viewed as a type of “limited public forum”?97  Or is 
it more accurate to say that the government’s decision to publish a 
trademark in the federal registration database transforms the 
trademark into “government speech”?98  If not, should trademark 
registration instead be seen as a “benefit” akin to those addressed 
96. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2298–99.
97. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07
(2001) (describing the free speech principles applicable to private speech in a 
“limited public forum”); see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. 
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (explaining the Court’s “forum-based” free 
speech framework). 
98. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009)
(recognizing the principle that “the Free Speech Clause . . . does not regulate 
government speech”).  In Matal v. Tam, there was consensus among the 
Justices on this point at least—that trademark registration does not turn a 
private trademark into “government speech.”  See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1760 
(stating for the Court that “[t]rademarks are private, not government, 
speech”). 
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in the government spending cases?99  Or is a trademark more 
properly characterized as “commercial” speech that the government 
may more readily regulate?100  The Tam decision foundered on 
these very issues.  It was disagreement among the Justices about 
how to characterize trademark registration, and which line of First 
Amendment free speech cases to invoke, that resulted in the lack of 
a majority opinion in Tam.  The unsatisfactory state of First 
Amendment free speech law is highlighted, once again, in the Iancu 
decision.  First Amendment law presented a series of shoals that 
Justice Kagan would need to navigate if she was to hold together a 
majority, as explained further below. 
A. The Rigid “Taxonomy” of Modern First Amendment Free
Speech Law
Both Iancu and Tam illustrate that a great deal of time and 
energy is spent in modern First Amendment free speech cases 
arguing over which of the legal “boxes” created by the Supreme 
Court is the proper category.  Justice Breyer lamented this in his 
separate opinion in Iancu, urging the Court to “place less emphasis 
on trying to decide [how] the statute at issue should be 
characterized” and more time focusing on the “values the First 
Amendment seeks to protect.”101  As he pithily observed, “[t]he 
First Amendment is not the Tax Code.”102  That was an apt 
observation.  The free speech guarantee in the First Amendment is, 
of course, addressed to governmental restrictions on private speech.  
Such restrictions can take many forms.  A city rule that requires a 
permit to hold a rally in a city park is a government rule restricting 
private speech (though perhaps permissibly), as is a federal agency 
regulation that bars or requires certain terms in advertising for 
drug products. A statute criminalizing fraudulent 
99. See, e.g., Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S.
205, 214–15 (2013) (explaining the principle that Congress, in enacting 
spending programs, can impose speech-related restrictions to ensure funds are 
used for the activities it wishes to subsidize).   
100. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 
447 U.S. 557, 564–65 (1980) (articulating the free speech doctrines applicable 
to government regulation of “commercial speech”).   
101. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2304–05 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).  
102. Id. at 2304.
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misrepresentations is another restriction on private speech (though 
certainly permissible).  Many, many more examples exist, reflecting 
the wide gamut of legal contexts in which government rules may 
result in restrictions on private speech. 
Rather than create a general constitutional principle to cover 
the full range of free speech cases, the Supreme Court has created 
separate free speech rules for particular categories of cases.  Courts 
tend to apply these doctrines quite rigidly and formalistically.103  
As Justice Breyer observes, the Court tends to “deduc[e] the 
answers to First Amendment questions strictly from categories,” an 
approach he believes to be misguided.104  Even more important 
than the categories themselves is the consequences that flow from 
choosing the category.  Depending on which First Amendment “box” 
is deemed to be most apt, the Court’s weighing of the government 
and private interests—the degree of scrutiny—will differ 
significantly.  
B. The Real Issue:  What Balancing Test is Dictated Here?
In certain relatively rare circumstances, the Supreme Court
does not engage in any interest balancing.  At one end of the 
spectrum, the Court has held that certain speech does not enjoy any 
First Amendment protection.  In areas where the need for 
government control is most evident, the Court has simply declared 
that certain private speech is not protected by the First Amendment 
at all; speech in that category includes fraudulent statements, 
obscenity, and “fighting words.”105  Excluding such speech from 
constitutional protection eliminates any First Amendment 
challenge to statutes that criminalize fraud and validates other 
governmental schemes where the Court concludes that the private 
speaker has no legitimate interest while the government’s interest 
is great (such as obscenity). 
More often, however, the Court has created separate lines of 
authority dictating the particular balancing test to use in a given 
setting to weigh the private speaker’s right to speak with the 
103. See id. at 2304 (arguing that the Court has sometimes applied free
speech rules “too rigidly,” especially those related to “content discrimination”).  
104. Id. at 2305.
105. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (noting that the
government may properly ban obscenity and “fighting words”).  
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government’s interest in restricting, burdening, or barring that 
speech.  How to strike the appropriate balance for a particular 
setting has been a continuing challenge, particularly given the 
Supreme Court’s relatively recent expansion of free speech 
protections to commercial speech (previously put in the category of 
speech that had no First Amendment protection).106  The most 
significant factor in these decisions—significant, that is, in terms of 
being outcome-determinative—is the “level of scrutiny” dictated by 
a particular line of free speech cases. 
Will the government simply be expected to articulate some 
reasonable interest (to which the courts will generally defer)?  Or 
will the courts closely scrutinize the government’s reasons for 
restricting speech (putting a thumb on the side of the scales for the 
private speaker)?  It is said, with some accuracy, that a “strict 
scrutiny” test is “strict in theory, fatal in fact.”107  On the other 
hand, so-called “intermediate scrutiny” tests can have the opposite 
problem, that of excessive deference to governmental interests.  The 
development of varying levels of scrutiny in First Amendment free 
speech cases has, not surprisingly, led to fierce battles about in 
what “box” any given free speech restriction should be placed, since 
the Court’s preliminary decision about how to categorize the case 
will determine the level of scrutiny (and ultimately, predict the case 
outcome).  Justice Breyer explicitly describes the Court’s lines of 
First Amendment authority as “outcome-determinative 
categories.”108 
C. Avoiding Landmines in Drafting the Iancu v. Brunetti
Decision
Justice Kagan could not simply draft an opinion treating the 
case as a straightforward application of the principles recognized in 
Cohen.  She had to find a route that would avoid the disagreements 
that would inevitably arise from any attempt to characterize the 
106. See generally 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 496–
500 (1996) (describing the evolution of commercial speech doctrine).  
107. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (referring 
to the notion that “strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact’” while 
seeking to dispel it).   
108. See Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2304, 2306 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting the Court’s tendency to treat its “speech-related 
categories . . . as outcome-determinative rules”). 
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Lanham Act’s statutory bars by explaining where the case fit within 
the existing First Amendment “taxonomy” (and what level of 
scrutiny followed).  One particular First Amendment “box” was 
already off the table:  The Court in Tam had sensibly rejected the 
argument that private trademarks accepted for federal registration 
become a type of “government speech” (giving the government full 
leeway to decide which trademarks to endorse or reject).109  The 
government is obviously not endorsing a trademark’s message 
when it grants a trademark registration, simply making the 
determination that a particular mark meets the requirements of 
federal law and putting the public on notice of the registration 
decision.  As Justice Alito aptly put it, “if trademarks represent 
government speech, what does the Government have in mind when 
it advises Americans to ‘make.believe’ (Sony), to ‘Think different’ 
(Apple), to ‘Just do it’ (Nike), to ‘Have it Your Way’ (Burger 
King)?”110  By the time Iancu arrived at the Court, it was clear at 
least that “[t]rademarks are private, not government, speech.”111   
Instead, there was heated debate over a closely related 
argument: whether trademark registration should be seen as a type 
of “government benefit” program, thereby bringing the case within 
the line of First Amendment law establishing that the government 
can decide which speech activities it wishes to “subsidize” in 
funding such programs.112  Federal trademark registration is often 
said to confer important “benefits” on trademark owners.113  It may 
seem tempting to invoke the government benefits line of free speech 
cases as the right “box” for the case.  In Iancu, for example, both 
Justice Breyer and Justice Sotomayor, writing in partial dissent, 
relied heavily on the notion that the government can legitimately 
decide to not provide the “benefits” of trademark registration to 
scandalous, offensive, and vulgar trademarks without violating free 
109. See Matal v. Tam,137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757–60 (2017).
110. Id. at 1759.
111. Id. at 1760.
112. See, e.g., Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S.
205, 214–15 (2013); see also Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1761 (noting that the 
“government is not required to subsidize activities that it does not wish to 
promote”). 
113. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1753.
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speech rights.114  However, the type of “benefits” addressed in those 
cases involve “cash subsidies or their equivalent.”115  Insofar as 
beneficial legal results follow federal trademark registration, these 
are more aptly described as the “legal consequences” of registration 
than as “benefits” in the sense used in those cases.  Trademark 
registration is a routine government regulatory scheme, not a 
spending program involving the type of “cash” benefits or grant 
funds at issue in the “government benefits” cases.  Whatever her 
own views on the propriety of treating trademark registration as a 
government “benefit,” however, Justice Kagan could not wade into 
this controversy without risking losing her coalition.  As Justice 
Alito emphasized in his plurality in Tam, the First Amendment’s 
“government benefits” doctrine presents a “notoriously tricky 
question of constitutional law.”116 
Some Justices urged the Court instead to treat trademark 
registration as a type of “limited public forum,” a designated 
government channel for private speech in which the government 
has power to ensure that the forum is used for its intended 
purposes, such as a school’s internal mailbox system.117  But the 
only arguable “forum” in the trademark registration program is a 
public online database listing those trademarks approved for 
federal registration (along with a docket disclosing the history of 
114. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2307 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (emphasizing that the government should be 
able to “disincentivize” the use of offensively worded trademarks by “denying 
the benefit of trademark registration”); see also id. at 2308 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasizing that the trademark 
registration system “confers a small number of non-cash benefits on 
trademark-holders who register their marks” and that the government “need 
not provide this largely commercial benefit at all”).   
115. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1761.
116. Id. at 1760.
117. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–
46, 49 (1983) (noting that “[i]mplicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is 
the right to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and 
speaker identity . . . . These distinctions . . . are inherent and inescapable in 
the process of limiting a nonpublic forum to activities compatible with the 
intended purpose of the property”); see also Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2305 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the 
case should be treated as “a limited public forum”).   
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each trademark prosecution).118  The database of federal 
trademarks is more akin to a court’s online docketing system than 
a forum for private communication.  If such databases create a 
“limited public forum” for private speech, then there are 
innumerable other such forums, including not only court and 
agency case docketing systems but also government databases 
listing car registrations, professional licensing, registered 
corporations, and the like.  Are registrants really “speaking” 
(presumably to each other) in such a database?  This argument is 
untenable.119  
Yet another First Amendment “box” urged upon the Court as 
the correct analogy for trademark registration was the line of First 
Amendment authority related to “commercial speech.”120  Where 
the commercial speech analysis applies, the government is subject 
to less exacting scrutiny of its conduct and governmental 
restrictions affecting speech are more likely to be upheld.  However, 
major controversy swirls over the proper application and reach of 
the commercial speech doctrine.  What should be considered 
“commercial speech,” and in what settings the doctrine should 
apply is a matter of debate.  Initially, the Supreme Court defined 
“commercial speech” as speech that “propose[s] a commercial 
transaction.”121  Thereafter, the Court spoke somewhat more 
broadly of commercial speech as “expression related solely to the 
economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”122  But, “the 
line between commercial and non-commercial speech is not always 
clear.”123  Speech can be both political and economically motivated 
(for example, an editorial in a newspaper) or both economically 
118. See Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS), https://www.
uspto.gov/trademarks-application-process/search-trademark-database [https: 
//perma.cc/Y293-JD6K] (last visited Dec. 1, 2019).   
119. See Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2305 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (seeing only a “vague resemblance” between trademark 
registration and a “limited public forum”).   
120. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 564–66 (1980) (articulating the free speech doctrines applicable to 
government regulation of “commercial speech”). 
121. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations 
Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).   
122. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 561.
123. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017).
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motivated and political (for example, a public service 
announcement made by a drug company).  The difficulty of applying 
the “commercial speech” doctrine is evident.  Trademarks, for 
example, are not necessarily related “solely” to the speaker’s 
economic interests, but instead can be both highly expressive and 
related to commercial activity.  The trademark at issue in Matal v. 
Tam was a prime example: Simon Tam chose “The Slants” as his 
band’s trademark to send a message about discrimination against 
Asian-Americans.124  As Justice Alito emphasized in Tam, 
“trademarks often have an expressive content.”125  Moreover, 
Justice Alito highlights a deeper problem with invoking the 
“commercial speech” cases in a way that would allow the 
government to cleanse such speech of “offensive” content.  As he 
observed in Tam, if “affixing the commercial label permits the 
suppression of any speech that may lead to political or social 
‘volatility,’ free speech would be endangered.”126 
After reading the numerous opinions in both the Federal 
Circuit and the Supreme Court in the two cases taking a wide 
variety of positions on how trademark registration should be 
characterized, the bottom line is best stated by Justice Breyer in his 
partial dissent in Iancu:  “This case illustrates the limits of relying 
on rigid First Amendment categories” since trademark registration 
“does not fit easily into any of these categories.”127  Given the stark 
disagreements among the members of the Court on how to 
characterize the trademark registration program for First 
Amendment purposes, Justice Kagan had to find a way to draft an 
opinion that did not require going through that step.  She did so by 
narrowly analyzing the case as one of “viewpoint discrimination” 
and making clear that no balancing of the government’s interests is 
required in any setting once this conclusion is reached.  Her 
approach succeeded in holding together an unusual assortment of 
124. Id. at 1751 (noting that while “The Slants” is a “derogatory term for
persons of Asian descent,” the “band members believe by taking that slur as 
the name of their group, they will help to ‘reclaim’ the term and drain its 
denigrating force”).   
125. Id. at 1760.
126. Id. at 1765 (plurality opinion).
127. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2305 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). 
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conservative and liberal Justices to make a majority,128 though one 
still senses that the decision is held together with string and tape. 
The limitations and benefits of her approach are explored further 
below. 
III. IANCU V. BRUNETTI’S SOLUTION: FLAWS AND BENEFITS IN A
VIEWPOINT-DISCRIMINATION APPROACH
When the Supreme Court decided Tam, as noted, deep
divisions over the proper direction of free speech doctrine divided 
the Court and made unity impossible, even though the eight 
Justices all agreed both on the core principle and on the case 
outcome.  By the time the Iancu decision was issued, Justice Kagan 
had of course taken over the drafting pen.  With participation by 
two new Justices (Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh), she convinced 
six members of the Court to join a single opinion holding that the 
Lanham Act bar on registering “immoral or scandalous” 
trademarks should be struck down as unconstitutional viewpoint 
discrimination.  To reach that outcome, however, Justice Kagan 
finessed several significant issues that, had they been engaged, 
might well have unraveled the majority. 
A. Hints That a Viewpoint Discrimination Lens is Not Entirely
Satisfactory
In particular, the Court avoided answering two central 
questions: First, is Mr. Brunetti’s “vulgar” trademark 
constitutionally entitled to free speech protection?  And second, can 
this case really be analyzed based only on viewpoint 
discrimination?  Asking these questions yields interesting results. 
1. Are “Vulgar” Trademarks Constitutionally Protected?
The dissenting Justices express a shared sense of offense at the
vulgarity of Mr. Brunetti’s “FUCT” trademark (and similar or 
worse marks) and the idea that the PTO would have to register 
trademarks of this ilk.  Justice Sotomayor, in dissent, predicts a 
“coming rush” of trademark owners seeking to register “the most 
128. Id. at 2294.  The majority consisted of Justice Thomas, Justice
Ginsburg, Justice Alito, Justice Gorsuch, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice 
Kagan.   
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vulgar, profane or obscene words and images imaginable.”129 
Justice Roberts cannot imagine reading the First Amendment’s free 
speech right to “require the Government to give aid and comfort to 
those using obscene, vulgar, or profane modes of expression.”130  
The majority does not engage on this issue, other than to emphasize 
that the Lanham Act’s “scandalousness” bar “covers the universe of 
immoral or scandalous” material, and is not limited to vulgar or 
profane speech.131  Ironically, given that Mr. Brunetti’s “FUCT” 
trademark was rejected on the ground that it was “vulgar,” the 
majority opinion expresses no view as to whether “vulgar” 
trademarks are protected by the free speech guarantee.  It steers 
entirely clear of the hot-button issue of “vulgar” material. 
Instead, the Court emphasizes the statute as a whole, finding 
that the “statute, as written, does not draw the line at lewd, 
sexually explicit, or profane marks.”132  The examples of 
trademarks that the majority opinion uses as illustrations, notably, 
do not include a single one that would be considered vulgar.133  
While this case involves a facial challenge, the omission is still 
striking.  Rather than talk about “vulgar” trademarks, Justice 
Kagan uses stirring analogies, comparing the case to a statute by 
which the government purported to ban “subversive” speech 
(clearly unconstitutional).134 
The majority’s avoidance of any direct engagement on the issue 
of “vulgarity” reflects the very cautious steps needed to avoid 
plunging the Court back into the disputes that precluded 
agreement in Tam.  Notably, the government had invited the Court 
129. Id. at 2308 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130. Id. at 2303–04 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(finding the government to have “at least a reasonable interest in ensuring that 
it is not involved in promoting highly vulgar or obscene speech”).   
131. Id. at 2301 (majority opinion).
132. Id.
133. See id. at 2300–01.  The Federal Circuit was more direct in openly
analyzing the many examples of (and flaws in) the statute as applied to vulgar 
marks such as “FUCT.”  See In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1352–55 (Fed. Cir. 
2017) (emphasizing that the “government does not have a substantial interest 
in protecting the public from scandalousness and profanities”).  The Federal 
Circuit’s decision devotes an entire page to analyzing the PTO’s inconsistent 
treatment of trademarks like “FCUK,” “FUGLY,” “ROLL TURD,” and “MILF” 
(an acronym for “moms I’d like to fuck”).  Id. at 1354.   
134. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2302.
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in Iancu to adopt a “limiting construction” by reading the “immoral 
or scandalous” statutory ban as limited to marks offensive “because 
of their mode of expression, independent of any views that they may 
express.”135  In essence, the government would have read the ban 
to bar only trademarks that express their message in a vulgar, 
lewd, profane, or sexually explicit manner (such as Mr. Brunetti’s 
brand-name).136  There was already precedent for rejecting that 
position.  The Cohen Court had explicitly and definitively rejected 
the same argument: It held that the “mode” of expression—in 
Cohen, using profanity as part of a political message—is protected 
as much as the content of speech.137  But Justice Kagan chose not 
to engage on this issue either with the dissenters, who believed that 
this narrower reading would be both reasonable and 
constitutional,138 or with concurring Justice Alito, who urged 
Congress to amend the statute to limit it to “vulgar” trademarks.139  
To take on that issue would have led the Court into the very interest 
balancing it was trying to avoid.  Consider, for example, the reading 
proposed by Justice Sotomayor, who urged that at least as to the 
bar on “scandalous” trademarks, the Lanham Act could reasonably 
be read “to address only obscenity, vulgarity, and profanity.”140  
Notably, however, only one of these three types of speech—
obscenity—has been held to lie outside of free speech protection 
altogether.141  As Cohen makes clear, in contrast to obscenity, 
vulgar and profane words like “Fuck the Draft” may indeed enjoy 
135. Id. at 2301.
136. Id.
137. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
138. See Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2317 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that “[p]rohibiting the registration of obscene, 
profane, or vulgar marks qualifies as reasonable, viewpoint-neutral, content-
based regulation”). 
139. Id. at 2303 (Alito, J., concurring).  Justice Alito, who joined the
majority, also wrote separately to emphasize similarly his belief that Congress 
could amend the statute to “preclude[] the registration of marks containing 
vulgar terms that play no real part in the expression of ideas.” Id.  
140. Id. at 2308 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that a narrowed reading of the statute “would save it from 
unconstitutionality”); see also id. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (concluding likewise that “refusing registration to obscene, 
vulgar or profane marks does not offend the First Amendment”).   
141. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 485 (1957) (holding that
“obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press”). 
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free speech protection.142  Limiting the statute as Justice 
Sotomayor proposes would not, in fact, have made the 
constitutionality inquiry easier.  Instead, it would have led the 
Court down the same rabbit hole it fell into in Tam. 
What government interest could possibly sustain the 
constitutionality of a statute burdening “vulgar” speech?  Chief 
Justice Roberts proposes one: barring the registration of obscene, 
vulgar or profane trademarks would be adequately supported by 
the government’s interests in “not associating itself with 
trademarks whose content is obscene, vulgar or profane.”143  In 
other words, the government should be able to treat vulgar speech 
differently because it does not approve of vulgar speech.  Such a 
circular rationale is not usually an adequate justification for First 
Amendment purposes.144  Rather than take on the issue, Justice 
Kagan (wisely perhaps given the context) simply states that “even 
assuming” the government’s reading would eliminate First 
Amendment problems, it is simply not a reasonable reading of the 
statutory language.145  Thus, the question that is not aired in the 
majority opinion is how such a “narrowing reading” could possibly 
be constitutional.  Can it really be that Congress can freely 
regulate, prohibit or burden private speech on the ground that it 
includes swear words (particularly in a setting outside of schools or 
captive audiences)?  “Vulgarity” may be distasteful, but it does not 
fall into any category of speech that does not enjoy First 
Amendment protection, such as obscenity, fighting words, and 
fraudulent or deceptive speech.  The Supreme Court in Cohen had 
no difficulty in discerning that penalizing a speaker for using 
vulgarity to express a message (such as “Fuck the Draft”) is not a 
constitutional means of regulating speech.146  That frank and direct 
acknowledgement of the sometimes difficult truths that flow from 
the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee is missing from 
142. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20 (emphasizing that “[t]his is not . . . an
obscenity case”).  
143. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).  
144. See, e.g., Cohen, 403 U.S. at 22 (finding “plainly untenable” the
“general assertion that the States, acting as guardians of public morality, may 
properly remove [an] offensive word from the public vocabulary”).   
145. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2301.
146. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
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Iancu.  The Cohen case also involved a facial challenge to the 
California statute penalizing “offensive” speech, and the Court 
directly confronted the import of its holding:  messages expressed 
in profane language are protected by the First Amendment no less 
than messages using conventional political terms.147  Indeed, the 
Cohen Court emphasized that using profane language can be part 
of creating a powerful impact for the message, noting that “words 
are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive 
force.”148  In Iancu, by contrast, the Court emphasizes the facial 
aspect of the constitutional challenge, and steers clear from the 
“FUCT” trademark that sparked the challenge. 
While pragmatic, the majority’s strict focus on the facial 
challenge to the statute has an odd, though unstated, result:  Mr. 
Brunetti wins without ever receiving any affirmation that his own 
profane trademark is actually constitutionally protected speech.  By 
contrast, the Court did not shy away from the analogous issue in 
deciding Cohen in 1971.  While acknowledging that the answer may 
not seem “obvious” from the case before it, given the broader 
implications of its ruling, the Court flatly held that vulgar but 
peaceful speech, such as Mr. Cohen’s “Fuck the Draft” jacket, 
cannot constitutionally be restricted on the ground that the 
government, or some part of the public, finds that the message uses 
an “offensive word.”149  No such clear or direct engagement with 
the underlying issue of the individual challenger can be found in 
the Iancu decision.  That judicial reticence has an odd result: If 
Congress were to take up Justice Alito’s invitation, and rewrite the 
statute to bar only the registration of trademarks that include 
“vulgar” terms, the Iancu majority decision would not explicitly 
address the constitutionality of such a revised statute.  It is entirely 
possible that the Court will be presented with yet another 
constitutional challenge in its Tam-Iancu sequence if Congress 
takes up the invitation to rewrite the Lanham Act. 
If “Round Three” of the dispute follows, a revised Lanham Act 
will directly call upon the Court to say whether a statutory bar 
written to preclude only the registration of “vulgar” marks is 
147. Id. at 25.
148. Id. at 26.
149. Id. at 25; see also id. at 15 (noting that while this “case may seem at
first blush too inconsequential to find its way into our books, but the issue it 
presents is of no small constitutional significance”).   
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unconstitutionally “viewpoint discriminatory,” since it is hard to 
see what “viewpoint,” if any, vulgar terms are expressing.  As 
Justice Breyer observed in his separate concurrence, it is “hard to 
see how a statute prohibiting the registration of only highly vulgar 
or obscene words discriminates based on ‘viewpoint.’”150  The issue 
of the Supreme Court’s insistence that “viewpoint discrimination” 
is the real flaw in the Lanham Act’s “scandalousness” provision is 
taken up in turn below. 
2. Is “Viewpoint Discrimination” the Real Problem Here?
Justice Kagan does a masterful job of fitting this case into the
“viewpoint discrimination” box in the modern free speech 
taxonomy.  The concept of “discrimination” inherently suggests that 
the government is treating two similar groups differently,151 and 
her opinion highlights the ways in which the PTO discriminates in 
registration between those trademarks whose message offends 
public sensibilities (“BABY AL-QAEDA” for t-shirts) and those 
whose message accords with public values (“PRAISE THE LORD” 
for a game).152  The analysis worked well (or would have worked 
well) in Tam, because the concept of a “disparaging” trademark is 
inherently viewpoint-discriminatory. The statutory term 
“disparaging” itself dictates that the PTO look to the message of the 
trademark and discriminate based on viewpoint; those trademarks 
that “disparage” a group will be refused registration, while those 
that praise the same group will be registered.   
Can the same really be said for the bar on “scandalous” marks? 
Is discrimination based on viewpoint inherently required by this 
statutory term?153  Or is there a deeper issue here?  While the Iancu 
majority selects examples that reveal discrimination based on 
150. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2306 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).  
151. Most aptly, Black’s Law Dictionary defines discrimination as follows:
“Differential treatment; esp., a failure to treat all persons equally when no 
reasonable distinction can be found between those favored and those not 
favored.” Discrimination, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
152. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2300.
153. The dissenters agreed that a bar on “immoral” trademarks constitutes
viewpoint discrimination, but would have found a bar on “scandalous” 
trademarks constitutional.  See id. at 2309 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (noting that it is “with regard to the word ‘scandalous’ 
that I part ways with the majority”).   
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viewpoint, an even greater problem has been the PTO’s 
inconsistency and subjectivity in applying the statutory test.154  
There are two issues with respect to subjectivity in the agency’s 
pattern of applying the relevant part of the Lanham Act.  First, 
what was “considered scandalous as a trademark or service mark 
twenty, thirty or fifty years ago may no longer be considered so, 
given the changes in societal attitudes.”155  Thus, the statutory bar 
to federal trademark registration presents an uncertain and 
moving target for trademark owners.  Second, even within the same 
era, different trademark examiners may come to different 
conclusions about what is “immoral or scandalous.”  Studies 
comparing data concerning the treatment of similar trademark 
application requests have found the PTO’s decision making erratic 
and unpredictable.156  Consider the acronym “MILF” (which is 
apparently a well-known shorthand for the phrase “Mom(s) I’d Like 
to Fuck”).157  A 2011 study looked at trademark registration 
applications that included “MILF.”  As of that date, a remarkable 
total of forty-one applications had been filed seeking to register 
trademarks that included the term; of those applications, twenty 
were rejected as “immoral or scandalous” for using the term MILF 
while the other twenty were not.158 
Even considering that different products may have been 
involved, this data clearly suggests inconsistent application of the 
same legal standard by different government officials (which would 
scarcely be surprising).  It is hard to reconcile, for example, why 
“MILF MAGNET” would be granted registration as a trademark for 
athletic clothing but “MILF GOLF” would be rejected as a 
154. See LaLonde and Gilson, supra note 57, at 1477 (noting that the PTO
has “no independent standards that apply to such determinations, which are 
made by dozens of different individuals of varying political, religious, 
geographic and family backgrounds”).   
155. Id. at 1495 (quoting In re Old Glory Condom, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216
(T.T.A.B. 1993)). 
156. Consistency is also retarded by PTO guidelines, which specify that a
registration decision rejecting a particular trademark as “immoral or 
scandalous” has no precedential value for later registrations even when the 
very same terms may be at issue.  See id. at 1477–78. 
157. Id. at 1478.
158. Id.  These included such marks as “WANT MILF?,” “GOT MILF,”
“MILF MAGNET,” “DIARY OF A MILF,” “MILF HUNTER,” “MILF 
CLOTHING,” “MILF MATERNITY WEAR,” and so on.  Id. 
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trademark for women’s golf apparel.159  The risk of varying, 
standard-less, and subjective applications of the statutory standard 
seems clear. 
As the foregoing reveals, there is an issue here that goes 
beyond “viewpoint” discrimination: Government officials should not 
be empowered to award or withhold an important governmental 
status to a person based on an officials’ subjective judgment about 
whether or not a person’s speech is “scandalous” or offensive (even 
if the speech expresses no particular viewpoint, or the plaintiff 
cannot show disparate treatment).  By limiting the issue to one of 
viewpoint discrimination, the majority in Iancu accomplishes a 
critical step in the First Amendment logic.  If the regulation at issue 
discriminates based on speakers’ viewpoints, it is unconstitutional, 
period.  There is no need to look at the reasons the government 
offers to support the regulations.  That is so because it is impossible 
to come up with a neutral reason for adopting a viewpoint-
discriminatory regulation.  To defend a government rule that bans 
or burdens a viewpoint, the government must argue one of two 
things: either the viewpoint at issue is one that the government 
opposes, finds offensive, or does not support; or the viewpoint is one 
that members of the public oppose, find offensive, or do not support. 
Neither reason is a “viewpoint-neutral” rationale—that is, a reason 
for the rule that has nothing to do with the viewpoint being 
suppressed.  If the Iancu decision finesses certain key questions, at 
the same time, it does advance First Amendment law by making a 
clear statement on the doctrine of “viewpoint discrimination.”160  
Below, the strengths of Iancu are considered.  
159. Id. at 1479–80.
160. The Court has, without expressly saying so, adopted a view closely akin 
to that of Justice Thomas in Tam.  There, he said that viewpoint discrimination 
is unconstitutional, period, in whatever setting it occurs.  See Matal v. Tam, 
137 S. Ct. 1744, 1769 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment) (noting that “when the government seeks to restrict truthful 
speech in order to suppress the ideas it conveys, strict scrutiny is appropriate, 
whether or not the speech in question may be characterized as ‘commercial’” 
(quoting Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))).   
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B. Strengths and Enduring Themes in the Iancu v. Brunetti Decision
While narrow, and subject to the critiques outlined above, the
Iancu decision accomplishes several important things.  Not 
insignificantly, Justice Kagan takes a constitutional issue that was, 
if anything, more difficult than the issue in Tam and brings 
together a solid majority in favor of a clear First Amendment 
holding.  This was the point on which the Tam Court failed.161  In 
Iancu, the Court endorses in clear terms the constitutional 
principle that “if a trademark registration bar is viewpoint-based, 
it is unconstitutional.”162  The Court describes as a “core postulate 
of free speech law” that “[t]he government may not discriminate 
against speech based on the ideas or opinions it conveys.”163  
Because it finds the Lanham Act’s bar on registering “immoral or 
scandalous” trademarks to be viewpoint-based, the Court concludes 
that the statute cannot withstand a First Amendment challenge; to 
paraphrase the Court, the “finding of viewpoint bias end[s] the 
matter.”164  By so stating, the Court has clearly situated viewpoint 
discrimination as a circumstance that requires no balancing (and 
no need to characterize the law at issue on the free speech 
spectrum).  Whatever the setting, a finding that a government 
restriction on private speech is viewpoint-discriminatory ends the 
analysis.  There is no need to consider the government’s “interest” 
in the provision because there can be no legitimate government 
interest in suppressing a particular viewpoint.  In that sense, the 
case bookends the Court’s approach to categories of speech like 
obscenity, which likewise requires no balancing, though for a 
converse reason. 
The decision is also well-drafted in that it leaves room for a 
broader understanding of viewpoint discrimination.  The classic 
terms used in First Amendment law, “viewpoint discrimination” 
(and the related term, “content discrimination”), are misnomers in 
many ways.  The concept of viewpoint “discrimination” suggests 
161. See Kuckes, supra note 20, at 167 (arguing that Tam presented a “rare
circumstance[e] in which a law on its face violates the Free Speech Clause” and 
that the Court “missed an opportunity to make a clear statement of this narrow 
but fundamental point of law”).   
162. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2019).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2302.
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that there should be disparate treatment of different speakers 
based on the viewpoints they express (this idea is the focus of the 
majority’s decision in Iancu).  More broadly, the concept would be 
better described not simply as addressing discrimination by the 
government among private speakers, but also encompassing 
discrimination against any particular private speaker based on the 
government’s opposition to the speaker’s message. 
“Discrimination” is a poor term to capture the constitutional 
concept at stake. 
A statute that allows government officials to withhold a legal 
status to which speakers are otherwise entitled on the ground that 
the government finds their speech to be “immoral or scandalous” is 
a clear violation of the First Amendment.  This is exactly what the 
Lanham Act does.  But the problem is not simply that the 
government cannot treat different speakers differently, depending 
on the view they want to express (though this is certainly true).  The 
problem, more fundamentally, is that the government cannot 
suppress the private speech of even one person simply because it 
finds that person’s speech offensive, undesirable, socially 
unacceptable, distasteful or vulgar.  It was Justice Frankfurter who 
wrote that American citizenship carries with it the “right to criticize 
public men and measures—and that means not only informed and 
responsible criticism but the freedom to speak foolishly and without 
moderation.”165  Fortunately, Iancu is drafted to lay the 
groundwork for a broader understanding of the flaws in what is 
currently denominated “viewpoint discrimination.” While the 
principal focus is on “viewpoint discrimination” in the narrow 
sense, the decision also contains the groundwork for a holding, in a 
future case, that the doctrine is broader.  That is an issue that will 
certainly arise if Congress takes up the invitation to amend the 
Lanham Act to bar the registration of “vulgar” trademarks. 
Another challenge that faced Justice Kagan was drafting an 
opinion that reconciled the differing views between Justice Alito 
and Justice Kennedy as to exactly what the “viewpoint 
discrimination” problem was in the Lanham Act statutory bar 
165. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (quoting Baumgartner v.
United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673–674 (1944)).  
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cases.166 In Tam, Justice Alito’s vision of “viewpoint 
discrimination” was a broad one.  He argued that the First 
Amendment cases “use the term ‘viewpoint’ in a broad sense” and 
that “giving offense is a viewpoint.”167  In the plurality portion of 
his opinion, he invokes case law from the Cohen era holding flatly 
that “the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely 
because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their 
hearers.”168  Justice Kennedy, more narrowly, argued in Tam that 
the “essence of viewpoint discrimination” occurs when the 
government has “singled out a subset of messages for disfavor based 
on the views expressed.”169  His focus was on the fact that the 
government allowed the registration of a “positive or benign mark 
but not a derogatory one.”170 
Justice Kagan incorporates both concepts into the Iancu 
majority opinion.  The examples she gives are in line with Justice 
Kennedy’s focus (allowing the registration, for example, of 
trademarks that celebrate religion but not those that criticize 
religion).  But the decision also contains broader language.  The 
Iancu decision states, for example, that “as the Court made clear in 
Tam, a law disfavoring ‘ideas that offend’ discriminates based on 
viewpoint, in violation of the First Amendment.”171  It speaks as 
well of the unconstitutionality of a statute that “aim[s] at the 
suppression of views.”172  Those statements may prove key if there 
is, indeed, a “round three” in the litigation over the Lanham Act 
statutory bars. 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, one must admire Justice Kagan’s feat of discipline, 
careful drafting, and leadership in Iancu v. Brunetti in summoning 
a decisive Court majority for a clear (if narrow) statement of First 
166. See Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2299 (comparing the different approaches
taken by Justices Alito and Kennedy with respect to the application of 
“viewpoint discrimination” in Tam). 
167. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017) (plurality opinion).
168. Id. (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)).
169. Id. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). 
170. Id.
171. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2301.
172. Id. at 2302.
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Amendment law.  As this Survey shows, her task was considerably 
harder than in Cohen in 1971, where the Court could readily and 
broadly declare the unconstitutionality of a statute that allowed a 
speaker to be punished simply for publicly wearing a jacket stating 
“Fuck the Draft.”  By 2018, despite the similarity of the issues—a 
private speaker’s rights with respect to government restrictions on 
“vulgar” speech (here, the trademark “FUCT”)—the resulting 
decision is considerably narrower.  In the five decades since Cohen 
was decided, the development of First Amendment law into a highly 
compartmentalized “taxonomy” of numerous, distinct strands of 
legal doctrine has increased disagreements within the Court in free 
speech cases.173  In this era, it is quite frankly puzzling as to how 
to analyze a Free Speech case that does not fall neatly into one of 
the pre-existing categories.  The problem with that approach 
becomes acutely evident in cases like Iancu and Tam. 
The existing First Amendment categories simply do not work 
for every case.  At the same time, there is no overarching First 
Amendment free speech doctrine that ties the “taxonomy” together 
and supplies rules for cases not readily characterizable.  The 
Court’s struggle to fit the Lanham Act statutory bars into the 
existing First Amendment case law is a clear illustration of the 
problem.  Justice Kagan wisely recognized that the case could and 
must be decided without delving into the difficulties of First 
Amendment free speech doctrine.  Indeed, to include a foray in that 
direction might have made mustering a clear majority impossible. 
To that end, the Iancu decision is disciplined, tight, clear, and 
narrow.  It does the needed job even if in certain respects it may be 
criticized as incomplete.  Is the decision a disappointment or a 
triumph?  Skillfully drafted or overly cautious?  Forward-looking or 
limited in scope?  While only the future will determine the answers 
to those questions, Justice Kagan is to be commended for 
successfully rallying a majority for a decisive and sound First 
Amendment decision. 
173. See id. at 2314–15 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (contrasting the “taxonomy” of free speech terminology that is commonly 
used today with the approach 1971, when Cohen was decided).   
